State Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property: An Evaluation of the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act’s Attempt to Subject States to Suit in Federal Courts for Trademark Infringements Under the Lanham Act by Fessler, Jennifer L.
University of Massachusetts Law Review
Volume 3
Issue 1 Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property Article 2
January 2008
State Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual
Property: An Evaluation of the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act’s Attempt to Subject States to Suit
in Federal Courts for Trademark Infringements
Under the Lanham Act
Jennifer L. Fessler
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Massachusetts Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School
of Law.
Recommended Citation
Fessler, Jennifer L. (2008) "State Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property: An Evaluation of the Trademark Remedy Clarification
Act’s Attempt to Subject States to Suit in Federal Courts for Trademark Infringements Under the Lanham Act," University of
Massachusetts Law Review: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr/vol3/iss1/2
49 
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  AN 
EVALUATION OF THE TRADEMARK 
REMEDY CLARIFICATION ACT’S 
ATTEMPT TO SUBJECT STATES TO SUIT IN 
FEDERAL COURT FOR TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENTS UNDER THE LANHAM 
ACT 
 




States and state institutions actively participate in the 
trademark system, and maintain all the benefits of that system 
while escaping the limitations. For example, state universities 
hold rights to a massive amount of trademarks, and as such 
they have all the rights of a trademark plaintiff but avoid the 
liability of a trademark defendant. This means that a state can 
aggressively protect its mark by bringing suits against those 
who infringe it, while individual trademark owners cannot 
bring suit against the state for the state’s infringing use. It is 
easy to see the inequity present in this situation. Where is the 
fairness in allowing one trademark owner to avoid financial 
liability for its infringing actions, but not another? Where is 
the justice in allowing states to vigorously bring suits against 
others for infringements, but others cannot do the same when 
the state infringes their mark?  In New Star Lasers, Inc. v. 
Regents of the University of California, the court 
acknowledged the inequities present, and stated that it could 
think of, “no other context in which a litigant may lawfully 
enjoy all the benefits of a federal property or right, while 
rejecting its limitations.” 1   This is the very issue that 
                                            
* The author is an attorney and graduate of the Southern New 
England School of Law (J.D.) and the Franklin Pierce Law Center 
(L.L.M.) 
1 New Star Lasers v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 
1240, 1244 (E.D. Cal. 1999). 
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Congress set out to remedy in the Trademark Remedy 
Clarification Act (TRCA).2   The TRCA sought to place state 
and individual trademark holders on equal footing by 
abrogating state sovereign immunity, thereby subjecting 
states to suit in federal court for violations of federal 
trademark law, which is codified in the Lanham Act. This 
legislative action was in response to the Supreme Court’s 
announcement of the requirements Congress must meet 
before it can validly abrogate state sovereign immunity. 
However, like a metaphoric game of ping-pong, once 
Congress passed the TRCA in an attempt to meet the Court’s 
new requirements, the Court refined the requirements. Now, 
the TRCA must be examined to determine if it can meet these 
new requirements, or whether it will have to go back to the 
drawing board. This is an important evaluation to make, 
because if the TRCA fails to meet the requirements set forth 
by the Court, then its attempt to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity also fails, and the inequity remains.  
In Section II, I address the first issue in this comment; 
how this legal game of “ping-pong” between Congress and 
the Supreme Court began. Prior to the ratification of the 
Eleventh Amendment there were concerns that the states 
would be subject to suit in federal court. Then, when the 
Eleventh Amendment was ratified, those concerns were 
alleviated, but new issues emerged. The ratification of the 
Eleventh Amendment set the ball in motion, and so the game 
between Congress and the Court began.  At the outset, the 
language of the Eleventh Amendment was very narrow, yet 
the Court interpreted it broadly. This broad reading of the 
Amendment gave states greater protection than the plain 
language called for. As a result of this broad interpretation, 
the balance between the competing interests of state and 
federal government shifted in the states’ favor. After 
providing the states with broad immunity, and setting the 
balance of power into the states’ favor, the Court attempted to 
alleviate the inequity it had established by carving out some 
ways that a state could be subject to suit in federal court. One 
                                            
2 Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992) (codified at 15 U.S.C., 
§§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), 1127 (2000)). 
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of the ways the Court allowed states to be sued in federal 
court was if Congress abrogated state immunity through 
legislative action. It seems that ever since the Court gave 
Congress this opportunity to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity through legislation, it has done all it can to limit 
this ability and shield the states from such suits. Therefore, it 
appears that the Court and Congress are playing on opposite 
sides of the table when it comes to states rights. While the 
Court appears to be vigilantly fighting for broad protection of 
states rights, Congress seems to be aggressively trying to 
maintain some balance of power between individual and 
states rights by enacting legislation that would abrogate state 
immunity in appropriate circumstances. 
Section III of this comment discusses the tensions 
between the competing values of federalism and federally 
protected individual rights that recent cases illustrate. When 
Congress would create legislation with the intent to abrogate 
state immunity, the Court responded by placing greater 
limitations on Congress’s ability to abrogate through their 
broad interpretation of the language of the Eleventh 
Amendment. Congress then had to rewrite the legislation, 
only for the Court to turn around and find that the 
Constitution required even greater limitations be placed on 
Congressional authority to abrogate. Hence, the Supreme 
Court and Congress are more or less passing the ball back 
and forth between each other when it comes to abrogation of 
state immunity. In the context of trademarks, this is the game 
that has been played between Congress and the Supreme 
Court since the enactment of the Lanham Act.  
Section IV evaluates whether the new limitations placed 
on Congress’s ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
through legislation invalidates the TRCA’s attempt to 
abrogate. The Court has already struck down Congress’s 
attempt to subject states to suit in federal court for false 
advertising claims brought pursuant to the TRCA. However, 
the Court left open the question of whether Congress’s 
attempt to subject states to suit in federal court for trademark 
infringement claims brought under the TRCA is a valid 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity. In this section I 
examine the TRCA’s validity when it comes to trademark 
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infringement claims to determine if it can pass the vigorous 
test set out by the Court in such cases as Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida 3  and City of Boerne v. Flores 4 . Those two cases 
provide an analytical framework by which all legislative 
attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity must be 
evaluated.  
In Seminole Tribe, the Court established that there are two 
requirements that need to be met for legislation to validly 
abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, 
Congressional intent to abrogate state immunity must be clear 
in the language of the legislation.5 Second, Congress must be 
enacting the legislation pursuant to a constitutional provision 
that grants it the authority to do so. 6  Currently, the only 
constitutional authority recognized by the Supreme Court for 
Congress’s enactment of abrogating legislation is section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In determining whether 
Congress had the authority to act pursuant to its section 5 
powers, the legislation must then be evaluated under a three-
factor test set forth in City of Boerne.7 In this final section of 
the comment I will go through each of the three factors 
individually to determine whether the TRCA meets the 
requirements of that test.  
The first factor analyzes whether the interests sought to 
be protected by the statute are interests which are protected 
by the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. I 
submit that the interests protected by the infringement 
provisions of the Lanham Act are interests that qualify as 
“property” for purposes of the Due Process Clause. However, 
just because there is a constitutional right at issue, does not 
answer the question of whether there has been a due process 
violation. The TRCA also has to be preventative or remedial 
in nature, which is the second factor of the test. I suggest that 
in the case of a trademark infringement suit, the Court would 
not find the legislation to be remedial or preventative in 
                                            
3 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  
4 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
5 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).  
6 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. 
7 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
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nature because the record does not indicate any pattern or 
history of trademark infringement by the states or mention 
whether the states provide adequate remedies for such 
violations. I argue that by requiring Congress to provide such 
a record of violations it is ignoring the fact that a record 
cannot be established unless law suits are being brought, and 
few people are going to waste time and money bringing a suit 
against a state in light of the Supreme Court’s sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence. This requirement thus backs 
Congress into a corner from which it can never escape. 
Before the Court can conclude that there has been no pattern 
or history of trademark violations by the state, it has to first 
give individuals the opportunity to bring such suits against 
the state. Unfortunately, for lack of this record, the Court 
would probably come to the same conclusion that it did when 
it examined the validity of the Patent Remedy Clarification 
Act, which is that because there is no pattern or history of 
constitutional violations, there is no congruence or 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means to that end, which is the final factor 
of the test. Therefore, if the Court were to evaluate the 
constitutional validity of the TRCA’s attempt to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity and subject states to suit in federal 
court for trademark infringement, the attempt would probably 
be ruled unconstitutional.  
 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STATE SOVEREIGN 
            IMMUNITY 
 
“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not 
to be amenable to the suit of an individual 
without its consent. This is the general sense, 
and the general practice of mankind; and the 
exemption, as one of the attributes of 
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the 
government of every State in the Union. 
Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this 
immunity in the plan of the convention, it will 
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remain with the States . . .” 8 
 
Alexander Hamilton’s fears of federal government 
overreaching were expressed in the Federalist Papers.9 These 
historic articles illustrate the tensions between state and 
federal government that have plagued our nation since its 
formation. The problem still exists because there is a very 
fine line between the protection of individual rights and state 
sovereign immunity, and it becomes difficult to balance these 
interests. On one hand, the concept of state sovereignty has 
become a central tenet of federalism.10 On the other hand, one 
of the federal government’s historic roles has been to protect 
against the infringement of individual rights. The Eleventh 
Amendment immunizes states from suits in federal court, but 
the states are granted this independence at the expense of the 
federal government’s ability to enforce basic federal rights.11 
When a state impinges upon an individual’s constitutionally 
protected rights, enforcement of those rights by the federal 
government could threaten the sovereign immunity of the 
state.12  This is why it is crucial in our federalist system of 
government to find how to properly balance the power 
between state and federal governments. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has ruled unfavorably 
towards Congressional attempts to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity. 13  For instance, the Court found that a statute 
allowing an individual to sue a state for monetary damages 
for violation of an age discrimination law unconstitutional.14 
                                            
8 The Federalist Papers No. 81, at 487–88 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter 
ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).  
9 See Id.  
10 Id. at 390.  
11  See Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 394 (4d ed. 
2003). 
12  See Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 388 (3d ed. 
1999).  
13 Starting with Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and extending 
through Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) and Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).  
14 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66−67.  
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The Court has ruled similarly in intellectual property cases.15 
Based on these holdings, it seems that the Court is following 
the line of jurisprudence originally laid out in the early case 
Hans v. Louisiana.16 In that case, the Court held that a citizen 
could not sue his own state in federal court, thereby 
construing the Eleventh Amendment beyond its plain 
meaning.17 The Eleventh Amendment reads: “[t]he judicial 
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”18  If the Court 
were to follow a textual approach in interpreting this 
amendment then not only would a citizen be able to bring a 
suit against his own state in federal court, but there would be 
greater flexibility for Congress to validly abrogate state 
sovereign immunity in other contexts. However, based on the 
broad construction the Court gives this amendment, the states 
have expansive protection from suits against them in federal 
court, arguably beyond the original intent of Congress. 
 
A. The Ratification of the Eleventh Amendment 
 
The Eleventh Amendment was enacted in response to 
Chisholm v. Georgia.19 In that case, a South Carolina citizen 
sued the state of Georgia to collect on a debt that Georgia had 
accrued during the Revolutionary War. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to hear that case based on the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 which gave it original jurisdiction over suits between 
a state and a citizen of another state.20 The authority for that 
act was derived from Article III, section 2, of the Constitution. 
Edmund Randolph, an opponent of state immunity during the 
state ratification conventions, represented Chisholm in the 
                                            
15 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).   
16 Hans, 134 U.S. 1.  
17 Id. at 18−21.  
18 U.S. Const. amend. XI.  
19 Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419.  
20 The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).  
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suit. The state of Georgia declined to appear, claiming that it 
was not subject to the suit because it had not waived its 
immunity.21 The case seemed to revive the old issues and 
tensions that arose during the state ratification conventions. 
These issues, over whether the text of Article III subjects 
states to suit in federal court, and also whether states should 
be immune from such suits, was never resolved at that time. 
Many had opposed ratification of the Constitution because 
they did not believe states should be brought into the federal 
courts as defendants.22 The reason for these strong opinions 
was probably due to the fact that the states had accumulated 
large debts during the Revolutionary War, and there was fear 
that they would be dragged into the federal courts to account 
for these debts. This fear became a reality in Chisholm, and 
when the Court held that a citizen of one state could sue 
another state in federal court, the states reacted with 
hostility. 23  This prompted Congress’s proposal of the 
Eleventh Amendment one month later, and the states’ 
subsequent ratification, thereby preventing further suits 
against states by citizens of another state in federal court.24 
Congress’s quick response shows how important sovereign 
immunity was to the founders. That hostility towards 
subjecting states to suit seems to have resonated with the 
Court until the present day, and may be the reason for the 
Court’s continued expansion of the Eleventh Amendment’s 
meaning.  
 
B.  Limitations on the Broad Scope of State 
Sovereign Immunity 
 
Despite the narrow text of the amendment, the Court has 
continued to broaden its scope ever since the 1800’s25 when 
                                            
21 See Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, note 14 at 399, 400, 401 
(3d ed. 1999). 
22 The Debates in the Several States Conventions on the Adoption of 
the Federal Constitution, 526−527 (Johnathan Elliot ed. 1937). 
23 Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419−21.  
24 Hans v. State of Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890). 
25 See Id.; In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (holding that 
states were immune from suits in admiralty); Principality of Monaco v. 
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the Hans Court set forth the basic premise that the Eleventh 
Amendment presumes that states are sovereign entities that 
cannot be sued in federal court without their consent.26 In a 
century’s worth of cases reaffirming this broad principle, 
relief for private citizens with grievance against a state came 
in the form of the 1908 decision Ex Parte Young.27  Ex Parte 
Young opened the door to remedies for citizens who were 
harmed by a state action.28 The Court held that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not prohibit suits against state officers in 
federal court for injunctive relief. 29  However, it is 
questionable whether this alternative is adequate for 
intellectual property owners whose preference would likely 
be monetary relief. In 1976, the Court carved out another 
exception to state sovereign immunity when it held that 
Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity through 
legislation.30 In the case Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court held 
that Congress could validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment 
immunity when acting pursuant to the power granted to it in 
the Fourteenth Amendment.31 This clause grants Congress the 
authority to enforce the substantive provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment through “appropriate legislation”.32 
The Court also recognized the ability of Congress to abrogate 
state immunity when acting pursuant to its Article I powers 







                                                                                          
State of Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)(holding that states were 
immune from suits brought by foreign governments). 
26 Hans, 134 U.S. at 13.  
27 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  
28 Id. at 159.  
29 Id.  
30 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
31 Id.  
32 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §5.  
33 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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II. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS LIMITING 
               CONGRESS’S ABILITY TO ABROGATE STATE 
                SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BY LEGISLATION 
 
A. The Establishment of a Two-prong Test under 
which All Legislative Attempts to Abrogate State 
Sovereign Immunity Must be Evaluated 
 
The Rehnquist Court retracted from the exceptions to the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity that the Court had earlier set 
forth, thereby slowly shifting the balance more in the states’ 
favor.34 From these cases a two-prong test has emerged in 
which the validity of a statute that attempts to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity is evaluated.35  
Under the first prong, Congress must unequivocally 
express its intent to abrogate the state’s immunity. 36  This 
prong requires Congress to write the statute in such a way 
that its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity is 
unmistakably clear. 37  This “clear expression” prong was 
derived from the 1985 case, Atascadero State Hospital v. 
Scanlon.38  
The second prong requires that Congress act pursuant to a 
valid exercise of power.39 For the statute in question to satisfy 
this prong Congress must be acting pursuant to a 
constitutional provision which grants it power so to act.40 The 
Court in Seminole Tribe held that Congress cannot validly 
abrogate state sovereign immunity under Article I of the 
Constitution. In that historic case, the Supreme Court 
significantly altered the concept of state sovereign immunity. 
Prior to this decision, the Court, in Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Company, had explicitly upheld Congress’s ability to 
                                            
34 See Id; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
35 See Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc. v. McMahon, 80 F.Supp.2d 218 
(2000).  
36 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 55 (1996).  
37 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242. 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.  
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abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause.41 The result in Seminole Tribe was that Congress is 
no longer able to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant 
to the Commerce Clause or any other Article I power.42 
 
B.  Why the Enforcement Clause is the Only 
Constitutional Means by Which Congress Can  
Legislatively Abrogate State Sovereign 
Immunity 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from state 
deprivations and imposes due process requirements on states. 
Congress, therefore, has the authority under this section to 
create legislation that allows citizens to sue the state for 
deprivations that rise to the level of a taking without the due 
process of law.43 One of the reasons why the Court decided to 
allow Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity 
when acting pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, but not 
Article I, is because the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted 
long after the Eleventh Amendment, as opposed to the 
Eleventh Amendment, which was enacted after the 
ratification of Article I. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment 
actually trumps Article I, but the Fourteenth Amendment 
trumps the Eleventh. 44  The Court reasoned that since the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted well after the Eleventh 
Amendment, is clear that the intent was for the Fourteenth 
Amendment to alter the pre-existing balance of power 







                                            
41 Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1.  
42 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 at 66 (1996) (overruling 
Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1).  
43 See Alden v. Maine 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
44 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44. 
45 Id.  
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C. Additional Requirements Set Forth by the 
Supreme Court that Affect Congress’s Ability to 
Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity Through 
Legislation  
 
In addition to the changes made by Seminole Tribe, City 
of Boerne also had a significant impact on federalism.46 This 
case built upon the concept already stated in Seminole Tribe, 
that Congress can only abrogate through “appropriate 
legislation.” In City of Boerne the Court narrowed the 
instances where Congress could appropriately pass legislation 
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.47 It is 
clear from City of Boerne that Congress may only act under 
section 5 to remedy or prevent an action that violates the 
Constitution.48 In addition, to be “appropriate legislation”, the 
remedies provided must be tailored in a way that is 
reasonably proportionate to the violation that Congress is 
seeking to remedy or prevent.49 
When determining whether a legislative measure that 
subjects states to suits in federal court is appropriate 
legislation, it must pass the restrictive test laid out in City of 
Boerne. To pass this test, a set of factors must be considered, 
starting with defining the scope of the constitutional right 
sought to be protected.50 Once the right has been identified, 
Congress must show a history and pattern of state 
deprivations or infringements of that right. 51  Finally, the 
remedies made available in the statute must be proportionate  
to the identified pattern of violations.52 If the statute cannot 
meet the rigors of this test, then Congress will have exceeded 
the scope of its enforcement powers, and the legislation will 
be deemed an invalid attempt to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  
                                            
46 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
47 Id. at 520. 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356 (2001).  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
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D. The Effects of Seminole Tribe and City of 
                    Boerne on Intellectual Property Cases 
 
The Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne decisions 
materially restricted Congress’s ability to abrogate states’ 
sovereign immunity, and the impact of these decisions on 
intellectual property can clearly be seen in the cases which 
followed.  Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank53(hereinafter Florida 
Prepaid) and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board 54 (hereinafter 
College Savings Bank) illustrate how the prior Supreme 
Court cases have curtailed private persons ability to sue a 
state in federal court. In Florida Prepaid, a private bank, 
College Savings Bank, received a patent on its unique type of 
college savings account. 55  The state of Florida put out a 
similar payment program for college accounts, and the 
private bank brought a patent infringement suit against the 
state under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy 
Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act).56  The Patent Remedy 
Act subjects states, state officials, officers, and 
instrumentalities to suit in federal court for patent 
infringement.57 The state of Florida sought to dismiss the suit 
claiming the Act did not validly abrogate state immunity 
because Congress did not have the constitutional authority to 
do so.58 When the issue reached the Supreme Court, the Court 
used the two-prong test to determine if the state could be 
subjected to suit.59 The Court found that the first prong of the 
test was easily met because Congress had made its intent to 
subject states to suit in federal court “unmistakably clear in 
                                            
53 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627 (1999).   
54 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
55 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630−31. 
56 Id. at 632−33. 
57 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(f). 
58 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 633. 
59 Id. at 635.  
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the language of the statute.”60 Therefore, the Court was left to 
determine if the Act could meet the second prong of the test, 
which requires Congress to have the constitutional authority 
to pass it.61 Congress had stated three sources of authority for 
the Act: the Patent Clause, the Commerce Clause, and section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 When the Act was passed 
in 1992, Congress still had the authority to abrogate pursuant 
to its Article I powers.63 However, the Court noted that the 
Act could no longer be justified under either the Patent 
Clause or Commerce Clause, and could only be upheld if it 
were “appropriate legislation” pursuant to section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 64  The analytical framework 
established in City of Boerne was used to determine if this 
was in fact “appropriate legislation.”65 Under this analysis, 
the Court first asked whether the Act was seeking to remedy 
or prevent state violations of Fourteenth Amendment 
protections. 66  The violation that the Act was seeking to 
remedy was identified as “unremedied patent infringement by 
the States.” 67  Therefore, the Act was remedial in nature, 
however, the Act was not able to pass the final factor of the 
City of Boerne test, which requires congruence and 
proportionality between the Fourteenth Amendment 
protections afforded to patent owners and the remedies 
provided for those violations.68 Although Congress provided 
a few examples of patent infringement suits brought against 
the states, the Court found this evidence inadequate because it 
did not establish a pattern. 69  The Court reasoned that the 
remedy was, therefore, not in proportion to the harm.70 The 
Court noted that the Act might have survived if it had 
                                            
60 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 at 242 (1985).  
61 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 55 (1996).  
62 S. Rep. 102-280, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3093-94.  
63 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
64 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637−38 (1999).  
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 639.  
67 Id. at 640.  
68 Id. at 646−47.  
69 Id. at 640.  
70 Id. at 646−47.  
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provided a remedy for specific patent violations, such as 
intentional infringement by the state of a citizen’s patent.71 
Therefore, the Patent Remedy Act was held invalid due to the 
narrow standards set forth in City of Boerne. This case also 
shows the effects that Seminole Tribe has had on 
Congressional ability to validly abrogate state sovereign 
immunity by legislation. In holding that Congress no longer 
has constitutional authority to abrogate under its Article I 
powers, Congress only has one avenue of authority to justify 
its actions. Furthermore, this case illustrates the tremendous 
difficulty that Congress will continue to have in trying to 
enact “appropriate legislation” pursuant to the confined City 
of Boerne test. This case will have lasting effects on patent 
owners whose patents are infringed by a state. By 
immunizing states from suit in federal court for patent 
infringement, the Court has effectively left states 
unaccountable for these violations in federal court. 
Effectively, the only option of the patent owner is to bring an 
injunction action pursuant to Ex Parte Young where money 
damages would not be available.  
Similar ramifications of the major Rehnquist Court 
decisions affecting sovereign immunity can be seen in 
College Savings Bank, the companion case of Florida 
Prepaid. This case put into issue the validity of the 
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act’s72 (TRCA) attempt to 
permit suit against a state for false advertising claims that it 
made about its own product.73 The state of Florida challenged 
Congress’s attempt at abrogation, arguing that the Act was 
enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which is no longer 
grants Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity.74 College Savings Bank defended the validity of 
the Act, arguing that Congress also acted pursuant to section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when enacting the 
                                            
71 Id.  
72 Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992) (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C., §§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), 1127 (2000)).  
73 College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 668, 669 (1999).  
74 Id. at 671–72.  
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legislation. 75  The Court first determined whether the Act 
could cross the initial hurdle laid out in Seminole Tribe, 
which requires it be passed in order to enforce a right 
protected in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. College 
Savings Bank asserted that the Act was enacted to enforce the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it 
sought “to remedy and prevent” state deprivation of two 
property rights: “(1) a right to be free from a business 
competitor’s false advertising about its own product, and (2) 
a more generalized right to be secure in one’s business 
interest.”76 The Court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument, 
and found that the false advertising provision of the Lanham 
Act did not grant any “property” interest in the traditional 
sense of the word.77 Traditionally, the Court noted, a property 
right exists where there is a right to exclude.78 The Court 
reasoned that when a claim is brought against someone for 
the misrepresentations that it made about its own product, this 
does not confer on the claimant any right to exclude.79 In 
other words, the “activity of doing business” is not property 
for purposes of the Due Process Clause.80 
From these cases, one can conclude that if the Court 
reviews the TRCA’s attempt to subject states to suits in 
federal court for trademark infringement, it will go through 
the same analytical framework that it did in College Savings 
and Florida Prepaid.  
 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY  OF 
THE TRADEMARK REMEDY CLARIFICATION ACT’S 
ATTEMPT TO SUBJECT STATES TO SUITS IN 
FEDERAL COURT FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
UNDER THE LANHAM ACT 
 
The Lanham Act is the federal trademark statute whose 
main purpose is to protect consumers from confusion as to 
                                            
75 Id. at 671. 
76 College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 672.  
77 Id. at 672–73. 
78 Id. at 672–73. 
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
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the source of goods and services, and it provides civil liability 
for those who cause such confusion. 81  Such liability, 
according to the Act, can be imposed upon “[a]ny person.”82 
“Person” is defined in section 45 of the Act to include a 
“juristic person” which is a broad category covering “a firm, 
corporation, union, association, other organization capable of 
suing and being sued in a court of law.”83 Congress passed 
the TRCA in 1992 to clarify that it was Congress’s intent that 
states not be immune from suits brought under the Lanham 
Act, thereby expressly abrogating state sovereign immunity.84 
The TRCA amended the definition of “person” to include 
“any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or 
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his 
or her official capacity.”85 
The express abrogation language in the TRCA arose in 
response to a line of cases beginning with Atascadero State 
Hospital v. Scanlon.86  In Atascadero the issue before the 
Court was whether, under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a 
citizen could bring a suit against a state in federal court where 
he was seeking retroactive monetary relief under the Act.87 
The Court found that such suits against states in federal court 
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the Act did 
not clearly and unequivocally express Congress’s intent to 
abrogation states’ sovereign immunity. 88  Based on that 
holding, Congress could validly abrogate states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity so long as it made its intent clear in 
the language of the statute. The Federal Circuit followed this 
premise when it decided Chew v. California.89 In that case, 
the court found that states were immune from suits brought in 
federal court for patent infringement because the amendments 
to the Patent Act did not contain a clear expression of 
                                            
81 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A).  
82 Id. 
83 Id. at § 1127.  
84 Pub. L. No. 102-542 §1.  
85 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  
86 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).  
87 Id. at 235.  
88 Id. at 241–47.  
89 Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  
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Congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.90 
Following these cases, Congress amended the Lanham Act 
and the Patent Act to make its intent clear. It did so under the 
authority of Union Gas Company, which held that sovereign 
immunity is a judicially created doctrine, which Congress 
may supersede by a clear expression of its intent to do so.91 In 
order to fulfill the “clear statement” requirement, the TRCA 
amended the Lanham Act by providing that states “shall not 
be immune, under the eleventh amendment . . . from suit in 
federal court by any person . . . for any violation of this 
Act . . . ”92 Thus, the TRCA clearly subjects states to suits 
brought under sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act for 
federal and state trademark infringement.  
Trademarks are protected under state and federal law, 
which operate concurrently. The federal law that governs 
trademarks is the Lanham Act.93 The Lanham Act codifies 
common law protection for trademark rights and provides 
protection for those rights at the federal level.94 This means 
that the Act protects both federally registered and 
unregistered marks against another person’s use of a 
confusingly similar mark in commerce.95 Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act provides a federal cause of action against any 
one who uses a mark in connection with any goods or 
services in interstate commerce that is likely to cause 
confusion, mistake, or to deceive.96 Section 32 provides the 
same protection to the owners of federally registered marks.97 
Turning to the two-prong test, the TRCA easily passes the 
first prong by expressly stating its abrogation intent. 
Therefore, the real issue, when it comes to attempts to bring a 
suit against a state in federal court for violations of sections 
                                            
90 Chew, 893 F.2d at 334; See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).  
91 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 1–5 (1989).  
92 Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 1946 Pub. L. No. 102-542 
§ 3. 
93 Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051−1129.  
94 Id. at § 1125(a) (protection of unregistered marks); Id. at § 1114(1) 
(protection of federally registered marks). 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at § 1125(a)(1)(A).  
97 Id. at § 1114(1)(a). 
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32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, is whether Congress had the 
constitutional authority to subject states to such suit in federal 
court for money damages. Congress rested its authority for 
the abrogation on the powers given to it in Article I, 
specifically the Commerce Clause, and its power to enforce 
the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.98 
The Lanham Act itself was derived from the Commerce 
Clause. 99 Of course, it was not until 1996 that the Court 
overruled Union Gas Company in Seminole Tribe. 100 
Therefore, under the precedent established in Seminole Tribe, 
Article I powers cannot be the sole basis for abrogation. This 
means that the TRCA can only subject states to suit in federal 
court if it is “appropriate legislation” under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. City of Boerne has defined 
“appropriate legislation” as legislation that seeks to remedy 
or prevent violations of a substantive provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and does so in a way in which the 
remedy is in proportion to the harm or injury.101 
In order to fulfill the “appropriate legislation” test set 
forth in City of Boerne three factors must be met. First, there 
must be a constitutional right at issue that is protected by 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 provides, 
in relevant part: “. . . nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .” 
Accordingly, the TRCA must be seeking to protect either a 
life, liberty, or property right for purposes of the due process 
clause to be meet this initial hurdle. In the context of 
trademarks, the only section 1 right that could apply is the 
right of property. Therefore, a trademark must be deemed 
“property” for purposes of the due process clause or Congress 
will not have the authority to protect it under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Second, under the City of Boerne “appropriate 
legislation” test, the TRCA must seek to remedy or prevent 
state violations of the constitutional right of property. To do 
                                            
98 See S. Rep. No. 280, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1992), as reprinted in 
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3088, 3094. 
99 John T. Cross, Intellectual Property and the Eleventh Amendment 
After Seminole Tribe, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 519, 526 (1998).  
100 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72–73.  
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so, there must be evidence of a pattern of trademark 
infringement by the states or evidence that the states do not 
provide adequate state remedies to those who fall victim of 
such infringement. Finally, even if a pattern of trademark 
infringement by the states is found, there must be 
“congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”102 
 
A. Is a Trademark “Property” for Purposes of the 
Due Process Clause? 
 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress 
the power to enforce the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.103 The due process clause is violated when there 
is a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.104 When assessing the validity of the TRCA, 
the interests that the Lanham Act’s trademark infringement 
provisions seek to protect must be found to be the type of 
“property” interest which is protected by the due process 
clause. If there are no property rights which are protected by 
the due process clause, then Congress has no constitutional 
authority to abrogate.  
As already noted, in College Savings Bank the Court 
found Congress’s attempt to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity under section 43(a)(1)(A) unconstitutional when it 
comes to false advertising claims where the misleading 
statement is about the defendant’s own product. The Court 
concluded that Congress lacked authority to abrogate 
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
the interests protected by the false advertising claim did not 
amount to a property right which is protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 105  This was because the false 
advertising claim did not give its owner any right to 
exclude.106 On the other hand, the Court noted that “[t]he 
                                            
102 Id. at 520.  
103 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. 
104 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639. 
105 College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672–73.  
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Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect 
constitutionally cognizable property interests--notably, its 
provisions dealing with infringement of trademarks, which 
are the ‘property’ of the owner because he can exclude others 
from using them.”107 Where the former is not protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the latter is. The Court’s decision in 
College Savings leaves open the question of what rights 
embodied in the Lanham Act could be characterized as 
constitutionally protected property that are subject to section 
5 legislation.  
The owner of property is traditionally given the right to 
restrict and grant access to her property: in other words, the 
owner of property has the exclusive rights of control and 
possession of that property.108 For instance, when it comes  
to real property, an owner has the right exclude others from 
entering the property.109  Intellectual property rights provide 
their owners with the same rights to exclude as real property 
owners. Patent owners, for example, are granted the exclusive 
right to make, use, or sell their patented design, products, 
processes, etc. 110  Unlike traditional forms of property, a 
trademark is created by the mental impression it gives its 
customers.111 Since the value of the trademark is created by 
mental association the mark makes in the minds of its 
consumers,112 when a third person uses the same or  
confusingly similar mark, the association that has been built  
up in the consumer’s minds can begin to deteriorate. 113 
Therefore, the property interest protected by the trademark is 
not the trademark itself but rather the mental association, and 
the owner has a right to protect that mental association from 
deteriorating. If confusion is likely to occur in the minds of 
the consumer due to a third party’s actions (use in a similar 
                                            
107 Id. at 673.  
108 See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167–68 (1998). 
109 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
110 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).  
111 Id.  
112 See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
2:14 (4th ed.).  
113 See Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Leisure Time Prod., 17 F.3d 38, 43 
(2d Cir. 1994).  
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market of the same or similar mark), then those actions can 
be prohibited by the mark owner because he has a right to 
exclude such harmful uses which affect the mental 
association that has been built up in the mark. 
The difference between trademarks and patents is pretty 
clear. The latter gives its owner a right to prohibit another 
from making use of her invention or original fixed work, 
whereas the former gives its owner an exclusive right to use 
the mark as a brand identifier. The Court in Florida Prepaid 
recognized patents as a form of property that requires 
constitutional protection.114 When a state intentionally  
infringes a patent, the owner is deprived of a property interest 
of the type protected by the due process clause. 115  To 
determine if a patent is property under the Fourteenth 
Amendment the Court looked at how patents have 
traditionally been viewed by courts. 116  They noted that 
patents “have long been considered a species of property.”117 
We can conclude based on the Court’s analysis in Florida 
Prepaid, that the Court will place great weight on how the 
interest in question has been treated by courts in the past, and 
whether there are any recognizable traits of that interest that 
can be reconciled with the traditional rights given to property 
owners.  
The Court has recognized that, “[t]rademark law. . . 
confers private rights, which are themselves rights of 
exclusion.” 118  The trademark owner’s right to exclude is 
illustrated by the Court’s treatment of the term “Olympic.” In 
1987, the Court upheld Congress’s legislation giving the 
United Sates Olympic Committee exclusive rights to use the 
term “Olympic.”119 In the case before the Court, the Court 
found that the term “Olympic” was the property of the 
Committee, and so it could exclude others from using it 
                                            
114 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642.   
115 Id.  
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118 K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176 (1988).  
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without their permission.120 Although, there is an important 
distinction between an infringement suit brought by most 
trademark owners and one initiated by the Olympic 
Committee, because the latter’s right to exclude was created 
by statute, but this does not mean that other trademark 
owners do not have a similar right to exclude. Rather, the 
trademark owner just has a narrower right to exclude. He may 
only prevent others from using a mark which is confusingly 
similar to his and is sold in the same or similar market. The 
Olympic Committee can prevent anyone from using the mark 
irrespective of confusing similarity of the marks. This 
distinction is insignificant; either way a trademark owner has 
some rights to exclude. The only one who has the right to 
prevent consumer confusion is the owner of the trademark. 
This is the trademark owner’s exclusive right because 
consumers who are confused over similar marks do not have 
a right to bring suit under the Lanham Act.121 
College Savings Bank suggests that two things are needed 
for claims under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to be 
considered property. First, the claim must implicate the 
public’s right not to be confused and, second, the plaintiff’s 
right to control the reputation of his product. These are the 
two interests that the courts have recognized as property.122  
Both of these rights would be implicated in a trademark 
infringement suit. Not only is there a risk of consumer 
confusion, but also a risk that the good will plaintiff has built 
up for his product will be diminished or destroyed. As stated 
by the Second Circuit, “[t]he owner of the mark acquires the 
right to prevent the goods to which the mark is applied from 
being confused with those of others and to prevent his own 
trade from being diverted to competitors through their use of 
misleading marks.” 123  It would seem to follow that if an 
                                            
120 Id. at 535–37.  
121 See Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d Cir 1993); 
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individual trademark owner brought suit against a state for 
trademark infringement, then the owner of the mark would be 
able to meet the first hurdle of the City of Boerne test because 
the interests that the TRCA seeks to protect in an 
infringement suit are property interests that qualify for 
protection under the due process clause.  
 
B. Is There Any Pattern or History of 
Constitutional Violations that Congress was 
Seeking to Remedy or Prevent? 
 
If the Act passes the threshold questions of whether 
Congress has identified a violation of a substantive provision 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court must next determine 
if the provisions of the Act are remedial or preventative in 
nature.124  According to Justice Scalia, “as a logical matter . . . 
not everything which protects property interests is designed 
to remedy or prevent deprivations of those property 
interests.”125  The Court never reached this issue in College 
Savings Bank, because in the false advertising issue before 
the Court, there was no property interest that could be 
protected by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, so the 
Act was not able to pass the initial hurdle of the City of 
Boerne test. However, from the opinion in Florida Prepaid, 
we can conclude that the Court requires Congress to identify 
a pattern or history of state violations which it is seeking to 
remedy or prevent in the record.126 This logic stems from City 
of Boerne, which held that in order for Congress to rectify 
constitutional violations, it must establish a record.127 And, 
even if these violations are identified, they have to amount to 
violations of a constitutionally protected right. 128  Which 
means that the deprivation of a constitutionally protected 
property interest is not enough for the Fourteenth 
Amendment to kick in; there must also be a denial of due 
                                            
124 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639. 
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process of law that Congress seeks to redress.129  Below, the 
TRCA will be evaluated to determine if it identifies any 
pattern or history of trademark infringement by the states, and 
also whether the state remedies available for such 
infringements meet the adequacy test.  
In turning to the first question, did Congress identify a 
pattern or history of state constitutional violations in 
trademark cases, the identified violations must amount to 
more than a few instances of state constitutional violations, 
and the identified violations must be actual, not hypothetical 
or theoretical. Neither the Patent Remedy Clarification Act 
nor the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act were able to 
illustrate such a pattern of infringement that the courts were 
looking for.130 For instance, in Chavez, the court found that 
the few instances of state copyright infringement did not 
amount to a pattern.131 At the House Hearings for the Patent 
Remedy Act it was admitted that the legislation was passed as 
a “philosophical matter”. 132  The legislative record for the 
TRCA does not specifically state any actual incidents of state 
intellectual property violations, and the Senate Report does 
not give even one example of trademark infringements by the 
states. The only evidence that could be presented to the Court 
is a study conducted by the General Accounting Office 
(GAO). This study found that a state has been sued in state 
and federals court for intellectual property violations only 
fifty-eight times since 1985. 133  This number of violations 
covering all types of intellectual property over a course of 
fifteen years would probably not amount to a pattern in the 
Court’s eyes sufficient to support the validity of the TRCA’s 
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attempt to subject states to suit in federal court for trademark 
infringement. However, one might question whether this 
showing of a pattern or history of trademark infringements by 
the state could ever be proven. It is possible that there are 
more instances of trademark infringement by states occurring 
yet the studies would not capture such a pattern because they 
are only looking towards actual suits being brought against 
the states for these violations. However, one might argue that 
a prudent attorney would not bring a suit against a state for 
such violations due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. A 
similar issue was identified by Mr. James Rogan, Director of 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, in noting that 
the GAO study might be flawed due to the fact that state 
universities and state attorney generals often handle 
infringement accusations by administrative procedures, and 
so those accusations would be unaccounted for.134  This is 
probably something the Court should take into account when 
considering this factor of the test. 
As the TRCA now stands, there is clearly an absence of 
any “record” of trademark infringement by the states. In 
addition, even if the Court did look past the four corners of 
the record, there still is a lack of evidence of any pattern or 
history of these violations. Congress cannot seek to remedy a 
violation that does not exist. Therefore, the Court would 
probably find that the TRCA, although intended to remedy 
and prevent state violations under the Lanham Act, does not 
actually remedy or prevent anything, because no such 
violations exist. However, if the Court were to find that such 
a pattern does exist, this is not the end of the inquiry. The 
next question is whether there are available state remedies in 
place that are adequate under the due process clause. A 
deprivation of property is not enough to constitute a 
constitutional violation; there must also be a denial of due 
process of the law.135 
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The Court will recognize a due process violation where a 
state provides inadequate remedies to those injured by its 
conduct. 136  In Florida Prepaid the Court followed this 
reasoning when it held there to be no constitutional violation 
if a state has provided adequate remedies to those it has 
harmed.137  They found that when it comes to state patent 
infringement cases, a state only violates the due process 
clause where the state does not provide an adequate remedy 
to the affected patent holders.138 One of the reasons that the 
Patent Remedy Act failed in Florida Prepaid was because 
Congress did not fully discuss state remedies available to 
patent owners.139 Also, the Senate Report did not make any 
mention of what state remedies were available for patent 
violations, and the House Report only discussed a few.140 
Some examples of remedies that states may have in place 
include: a general waiver of sovereign immunity for suits 
brought in state court for those harmed to recover damages in 
tort,141 inverse condemnation actions against the state for just 
compensation, 142  and common law remedies for unfair 
competition torts.143 
According to the legislative history, Congress adopted the 
TRCA in order to, “rectify the inherent inequity plaguing the 
area of trademark protection.”144 Congress noted that state 
court trademark remedies were inadequate compared to the 
federal remedies available.145 However, they did not cite any 
specific examples of such inadequacies. This blanket 
statement, without any evidentiary support, probably would 
not hold any weight with the Court when evaluating this 
factor. Case law suggests that “inadequate,” for due process 
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purposes, basically means that there are no state remedies 
available for relief of the deprivation.146  According to the 
Court, there is no due process violation even if the state does 
not provide all the same remedies that would be available 
under the federal law.147 In addition, there is no right to a 
particular form of remedy required by the Constitution.148 
Based on these articulations, we could conclude that having 
some remedy available for the injury in state court means that 
there are adequate remedies under the due process clause. 
Given the fact that Congress did not discuss whether there 
were any remedies available at state law, nor cited any 
specific reasons why the remedies that were available were 
inadequate, the legislation would fail to meet the 
requirements of this factor.  
 
C.  Do the Means Fit the End? 
 
The final factor of the City of Boerne test requires there 
be “proportionality between the injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means adopted to that end.”149 In City of 
Boerne the Court held that Congress only has the authority 
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact 
legislation that is remedial in nature, and not legislation that 
would create new rights.150 The legislation is creating new 
substantive rights if there is no congruence or proportionality 
between the identified harm and the means adopted to 
prevent or remedy that harm.  
Section 5 grants Congress the power to enforce the 
substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment through 
prophylactic legislation.151 This means that the Enforcement 
Clause gives Congress the power not only to proscribe 
unconstitutional conduct, but also to create legislation that is 
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aimed at remedying and/or preventing such conduct. 152 
However, the Court made clear in City of Boerne that it is the 
Court’s job to define constitutional rights, not Congress’s.153 
Therefore, if the legislation grants greater guarantees than 
those found in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then 
it must be aimed at remedying or preventing identified 
constitutional violations rather than expanding the definition 
of the substantive guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The test for determining whether the statute is proper 
prophylactic legislation or if it redefines the substantive 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, is whether there is 
congruence and proportionality between the constitutional 
violations sought to be remedied or prevented and the means 
to meeting that end.154 
The Patent Remedy Act failed under this factor because 
there was no pattern or history of deprivation of the identified 
harm, thus, the remedy was not in proportion to the perceived 
harm.155 In other words, to the broad scope of violations that 
the Act subjected states to suit in federal court was not in 
proportion to the limited number of constitutional violations 
in patent cases overall. This legislation went too far. Aside 
from Florida Prepaid, there are other cases that have not 
been able to pass this final factor. In Kimel v. Florida Board 
of Regents,156 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s 
(ADEA) attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity was 
found unconstitutional because it failed this prong of the 
test.157 The Court found that Congress did not have a good 
enough reason to believe that states were discriminating 
against their employees on the basis of their age.158 Because 
of this “lack of evidence of widespread age discrimination,” 
the remedies were not in not in proportion to the harm.159 The 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) also failed the 
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congruence and proportionality test in Board of Trustees of 
the University of Alabama v. Garrett.160 The Court found that 
Congress’s attempt to subject states to suit in federal court for 
damages under the ADA was invalid since there was no 
pattern of state discrimination that violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.161 As such, there was no congruence between 
the remedy and constitutional violations. 162  These cases 
suggest that any Act to be analyzed under the City of Boerne 
test next is likely to fail this prong.  
Legislation passed under section 5 would avoid 
overbreadth if it does not extend beyond instances of 
identified constitutional violations. South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach 163  illustrates a prime example of perfectly 
tailored remedial legislation. In that case, the constitutional 
validity of certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 were in issue.164 These provisions were upheld because 
they were narrowly confined to apply only to regions of the 
country where the worst incidents of voting discrimination 
had occurred.165 The courts have tried to illustrate how to 
tailor legislation in order to meet this factor. When a statute 
has been found to be overly-broad, the courts have made 
suggestions to illustrate what Congress could have done to 
make the statute be constitutional. The Fifth Circuit, when 
reviewing the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, suggested 
that the Act would not have run afoul of the City of Boerne 
restrictions if it had narrowed its scope to a specific violation, 
such as allowing suits against a state if the state does not 
provide adequate remedies for their infringing acts.166 The 
Court in Florida Prepaid made similar suggestions, such as 
limiting the Act to intentional patent infringements by the 
state. 167  These suggestions provide useful comparisons 
between legislation the court will find constitutional and 
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legislation it will strike down for going too far.  If the 
legislation at issue reaches cases where no due process 
violations exist, then the provisions are overly broad.168 
For the TRCA to be valid, the unconstitutional 
deprivations of property rights in trademark infringement 
cases must be in proportion to the scope of suits in which the 
TRCA would abrogate state sovereign immunity. This factor 
of the test goes hand in hand with the prior one. Congress 
must tailor legislation so that the remedy directly responds to 
the identified pattern or history of constitutional violations. 
The legislation would fail this prong automatically if there is 
no such pattern. In effect, Congress is creating a new remedy 
for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is exactly 
what City of Boerne prohibits. In City of Boerne, the Court 
examined the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 
which was enacted to limit the government’s ability to 
interfere with certain religious practices.169 In that case, even 
though the RFCA remedied some constitutional violations, its 
scope reached beyond the religious practices covered by the 
Constitution and, therefore, did not meet the congruence and 
proportionality test. 170  This shows that even if the TRCA 
remedies some constitutional violations, such as intentional 
trademark infringements, it would still be deemed invalid 
legislation because its scope goes beyond those instances, and 
applies to all Lanham Act violations.  
The language of the TRCA should be confined to 
abrogate state immunity only in cases where there is an actual 
deprivation of property without due process of law. As it is 
currently written, the TRCA abrogates immunity in all 
trademark cases, which goes beyond what is necessary to 
enforce the provisions of the due process clause. If the 
validity of the TRCA were examined again, this time in the 
case of a trademark infringement claim rather than a false 
advertising claim, the Court would probably come to the 
same conclusion that it did in Florida Prepaid, that Congress 
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has exceeded its section 5 authority.  
To be deemed valid, the TRCA would have to be 
narrowly tailored to apply only to certain types of trademark 
infringement cases or provide for suits only against states that 
have inadequate remedies or a high incident of infringement. 
The TRCA subjects all states to suit in federal court even 
though the legislative record does not point to any state 
violations which it is seeking to remedy or prevent. For this 
reason, the Act is overly-broad and not narrowly tailored to 
the harm. There is no congruence or proportionality between 
the injury Congress was trying to remedy and the means 
adopted to that end, therefore, the TRCA would not pass this 




There are two things that can be learned from this paper. 
First, the analytical framework developed by the Court in 
City of Boerne is a stringent test that has considerably 
narrowed Congress’s ability to abrogate state’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity through legislation. Second, only half 
of the battle was won when Congress enacted the Trademark 
Remedy Clarification Act. Although it met the new 
requirements the Court placed on legislative efforts in 
Atascadero, it is not able to meet the requirements that were 
later set forth in Seminole Tribe. The Rehnquist Court’s 
holdings indicate the Court’s active pursuit of state’s rights. 
These decisions have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment 
very narrowly.  Under this line of reasoning the TRCA would 
fail again if it were to be evaluated. 
The United States government is structured in such a way 
so that power is divided up between the state and federal 
government. 171  However, there are times when these two 
powers collide, and the Court is left to decipher how to 
balance these powers. It seems obvious that the Court would 
attempt to place the balance of power as close to the center as 
possible. However, the Court’s holdings in cases dealing with 
state sovereign immunity have largely been tipped in the 
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states’ favor. This is evident not only in recent cases, but 
from early on the Court has broadly construed the language 
of the Eleventh Amendment, thus giving states the upper 
hand.172 However, after City of Boerne, it is clear that the 
balance of power is now farther to the state side than ever 
before. In trying to keep with the City of Boerne rationale, the 
Court has, in effect, narrowed the rights protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.173 
The effect of the broad reading of the Eleventh 
Amendment, and narrow reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is that Congress is left with little ability to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity without being accused of 
substantively redefining the Fourteenth Amendment.174 The 
real effects of these holdings are seen when they are applied 
to a specific legislative attempt to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity. When it comes to the TRCA, the effects are clear. 
Even a legislative effort that seeks to protect a federally 
protected interest against state government infringement 
cannot survive the City of Boerne test.  
A trademark owner is given the right to exclude another’s 
use of a confusingly similar mark that would cause the mental 
association that it has built up in its customers’ minds to 
deteriorate. This right would probably qualify as a property 
right under the due process clause. Possibly the analysis 
should end there, but it does not. The TRCA would fail in the 
same way that the Patent Remedy Act failed when it came to 
patent infringement suits−because the legislative record lacks 
enough evidence of state infringements to qualify as a pattern 
or history.175 As I suggested earlier, this fatal flaw might not 
be because such violations are non-existent, but because these 
violations are just not reported and because trademark owners 
are not willing to bring suits against a state given the Court’s 
current sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Since there are not 
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any identified violations in the record, the remedy is seen as 
disproportionate because one cannot remedy where there is 
no violation. That being said, if a state was sued in federal 
court for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, the 
case would probably be dismissed and the TRCA’s attempt to 
abrogate in this area would be struck down in the same way it 
was struck down in College Savings Bank.  
 
